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In 2004, Professor David Gruning and I were asked, on behalf 
of the Association Henri Capitant (AHC), to undertake the transla-
tion from French into English of Professor Pierre Catala’s Avant-
projet de réforme du droit des obligations et du droit de la prescrip-
tion (avant-projet Catala).1 This avant-projet had received the in-
tellectual endorsement and moral support of the AHC. Our involve-
ment in the translation was justifiably grounded on the long estab-
lished, yet not well known, fact that the state of Louisiana is the only 
mixed jurisdiction to have a civil code written directly in the English 
language; this since 1870. Prior civil codes (1808–1825) were trans-
lated from the original French version into English. As a result of 
some “prophetic” misunderstanding between a few “interested par-
ties,” it happened that the same avant-projet Catala was also to be 
translated in English by two prominent colleagues from the Univer-
sity of Oxford: Professors J. Cartwright and S. Whittaker.2 One 
would think that two translations in the same English language of 
the same French text ought not to be much different one from the 
other except, obviously, for the selection, here and there, of a few 
words or a few grammatical constructions.  
What happened on April 1, 2008 at a colloquium held in the 
grandiose Senate building in Paris was as much a “collision” of a 
                                                                                                             
 ∗   Professor Emeritus, Paul M. Hebert Law Center, Louisana State Univer-
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 1. PIERRE CATALA, Avant-projet de réforme du droit des obligations (ar-
ticles 1101 à 1386 du Code Civil) et du droit de la prescription (articles 2234 à 
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AND THE LAW OF PRESCRIPTION (John Cartwright & Simon Whittaker trans., Hart 
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cultural and intellectual nature as had happened on the battlefield of 
Waterloo eleven years after the promulgation of the French Civil 
Code of 1804. One may wonder, perhaps even be puzzled, by this 
connection between a battle Napoléon lost to the British and a piece 
of legislation, the Civil Code, albeit of a very unique nature. Let us 
remind the reader that history tells us that Napoléon would have said 
on his deathbed that: “My true glory is not that I have won 40 battles; 
Waterloo will blow away the memory of these victories. What noth-
ing can blow away, what will live eternally, is my Civil Code.”3 This 
is where we found our inspiration and motivation: make “intellectu-
ally” eternal (if possible) the Civil Code of the “physically” defeated 
Emperor by transposing his code in the vernacular language of those 
who had won on the battle ground meaning, the ordinary and plain 
English language as contrasted with the English language of the 
common law. A daunting “challenge” for both of us.  
 Two translations in English were subsequently published in the 
same volume next to other translations in other languages. The 
translation made by our English colleagues is identified as “Anglais 
(O),” or English from Oxford, and our translation is referred to as 
“Anglais (L),” or English from Louisiana. We give here only one 
illustrative example of the two fundamentally different approaches 
in translating the same French text: 
French text: Il y a solidarité de la part des débiteurs, 
lorsqu’ils sont obligés à une même chose, de manière que 
chacun puisse être contraint pour la totalité, et que le paie-
ment fait par un seul libère les autres envers le créancier.4 
 
Anglais (O): There is joint and several liability amongst 
debtors where they are under obligations to do the same 
thing such that the totality of it may be enforced against each 
of them, and satisfaction by only one discharges the others 
with regard to the creditor.5 
                                                                                                             
 3. Alain A. Levasseur, Code Napoleon or Code Portalis?, 63 TUL. L. REV. 
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 4. CATALA, supra note 1, art. 1200. 
 5. CATALA, supra note 2. 





Anglais (L): There is solidarity between obligors when they 
are all bound to the same performance in such a way that 
each of them may be compelled to perform the whole per-
formance and when performance by one of them relieves the 
others towards the obligee.6 
This example could not be more explicit: what happened to the 
typical and traditional civil law concept of “solidarité”? What is this 
“joint and several” expression? Does not the word “solidarity” exist 
in the native, common, and vernacular English language? We can 
read the following definition of solidarity in the non-legal, Web-
ster’s New World Dictionary: “combination or agreement of all el-
ements or individuals, as of a group; complete unity, as of opinion, 
purpose, interest, feeling, etc.” Notice the simple, common words—
“agreement of all individuals” and “complete unity, as of purpose, 
interest.” These words surely fit perfectly with the civil law under-
standing of “solidarité”—“solidarity”? So, why resort to the 
common law words of “joint” and “several,” which refer to concepts 
that originate from a different legal regime (procedure as opposed 
to substantive law) and that have different legal effects from “soli-
darité”? 
From our point of view, where differences had to be stressed 
between an Anglais (O) and an Anglais (L) translation, we were de-
termined (and unwilling to bend) to emphasize the specificity and 
uniqueness of the civil law tradition and, therefore, of its traditional 
and specific language—French in this instance. Since we were car-
rying on the Louisiana civil law tradition that we can trace back to 
1808 and 1825, we had no difficulty or misgivings in our task. As 
Professor Alain Ghozi stated: “[i]n this domain, a literal [sic] trans-
lation has no room; to translate faithfully one must fully grasp the 
meaning of the rule, often in its raison d’être.”7  
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This first major and stimulating exercise in translation led us to 
face a major challenge: translate all entries of the Vocabulaire Ju-
ridique8 dealing with the subject matters of the French Civil Code. 
As one of four members of the Scientific Committee of the Diction-
ary of the Civil Code9 and lead translator, I was overwhelmed by 
this monumental task. To find strength and cohesiveness in num-
bers, I invited several colleagues to tackle Cornu in English!10 
I had flashbacks of summers I spent with an uncle of mine, a 
farmer, who acquired several acres of land in the Gers area of 
France. The land had been fallow and uncultivated for several years 
and therefore required much hard work to turn it into sunflower, 
corn, and wheat fields. My uncle and I could see in our imagination 
those beautiful fields and the satisfaction they would bring one day. 
One day? My uncle was not one to back off from the task and I was 
committed to helping him. And so we spent the first summer oper-
ating a bulldozer day and night—my uncle at night and I in the day-
time—clearing the land, opening paths in the woods, digging ponds, 
and placing drains in the ground. By the end of that first summer a 
new creation had emerged from our determination and hard work. 
Over the following summers, the land was covered with sunflowers 
swaying in the wind; with wheat pointing straight to the sky; with 
corn showing its beard. We did it; our hard work had paid off. 
I felt also like how a sculptor probably feels when he faces a 
block of marble out of which he is to carve a statue. Most likely, the 
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sculptor sees in his mind and feels in his heart far beyond the block 
of marble. He can touch the silhouette, the curvature, and the profile 
of the statue before it finds life in his skilled and toned hands. To 
translate is, in a sense, to practice the art of shaping and carving out 
all the beliefs, aspirations, ideals, and values that are hidden in a 
given block of words; it is to transform them into words meant to 
captivate the awareness of the mind and the sensitivity of the heart 
of the reader. Words identified with the vernacular language of a 
people are the outward expression of symbols, images, and icons 
that their culture conveys in an attempt to bring the reader or listener 
into its depths, through the use of the reader’s or listener’s own lan-
guage. Therefore, it becomes the duty and mission, more than the 
mere role of the translator-artist, to trust in his talent, permeated with 
human feelings and guided by his intellectual skill, to shape the cul-
ture of one people, the “sender,” into a work that another people, the 
“receiver,” may readily understand and appreciate as being worthy 
of as much respect in its own culture. The translator must use lan-
guage, on his side of the mirror, that is transparent, not opaque, 
thoughtful and not dismissive, so that the reader-receiver will be 
able to see, couched in his own language on his side of the same 
mirror, the very message the sender meant to convey:  
[t]his idea of translation as transportation commits us implic-
itly to a certain view of meaning, namely, that it is like an 
object that can be picked up out of the place where it is found 
and dropped into another place; or, to put it another way, that 
the meaning of a sentence can be separated from its words- 
from its language, from its cultural context-and-reproduced 
in another. At the center of law is the activity of translation. 
To translate at all . . . requires that one learn the language of 
another, recognize the inadequacy of one’s own language to 
that reality, yet make a text, nonetheless, in response to it. 
Should it accordingly be a constant and central aim of the 
translator to bring his own reader to a new consciousness of 
the limits of his language in relation to another? Not by 
changing English, say, into some foreign thing, but far more 
subtly, by reminding the reader that one is always at the edge 
of what can be done; that beyond it is something unknown 




and if only for that reason wonderful; that, like grammar, a 
translation never be more than a partial substitute for an ed-
ucation . . . . There is no ‘translation,’ only transformation 
achieved in a process by which one seeks to attune oneself 
to another’s text and language, to appropriate them yet to re-
spect their difference and autonomy as well, in what Hugh 
Kenner calls ‘interchanges of voice and personality.’ In 
making (and reading) translations we should think and 
speak, then, not about transportable ‘content,’ but about the 
relations-between texts, between languages, between peo-
ple-that we establish in our own compositions; about the at-
titudes towards other people, other languages, that we em-
body in our expressions.11  
As Judge Nicholas Kasirer wrote: “[t]ranslation is, inevitably, 
the occasion for the appropriation and the reinvention of a text ac-
cording to the views and values of the translator and, as one scholar 
has recently argued, according to the time and place in which the 
translator works.”12  
With respect to translation as a process of “transformation” or 
“appropriation and reinvention,” I believe that the civil law, as a ma-
jor legal tradition, has an advantage over the common law as another 
major legal tradition. That advantage, I believe, is that the civil law 
is drafted in the language of the “reasonable man,” the language of 
the “farmer” for whom the law of property, successions, etc., was 
written.  
The language of the civil law has also been described as the lan-
guage of the man who stands on the back platform of a Parisian bus. 
In the days of René David, the man who coined this expression, Pa-
risian buses were fitted with a platform, where most bus riders pre-
ferred to stand and enjoy the ride.13  
Ever since its founding years in the eleventh and twelfth centu-
ries, “legal technicians,” mostly judges, have written the common 
                                                                                                             
 11. JAMES BOYD WHITE, JUSTICE AS TRANSLATION: AN ESSAY IN CULTURAL 
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law for “legal technicians,” not for the “common man.” Because the 
linguistics can be extremely different, the translator is confronted 
with the difficult task of having to turn the technical, special, “tailor-
made” language of the common law into the average, “common-
man” language of the civil law. 
The functional importance of translating the culture and the 
spirit of a legal system into a language that is foreign to it, consists 
in selecting honest and truthful means of bringing forth the social, 
spiritual, ethical values of that system so that they will be received 
and understood in that foreign language without mischaracterization 
or distortion. The translator must be, therefore, fully ready to accept 
and endure the headaches and heartaches of his mission particularly 
when he will be confronted with legal concepts and institutions, 
which intimately reflect and embody the exclusive identity of the 
specific features of one legal tradition in contrast with the features 
of another legal tradition.14 This is where the translator will have to 
become a skilled linguist, clothed in a legal scholar’s garment, in 
addition to being an anthropologist, philosopher, historian, sociolo-
gist; an overwhelming endeavor, which should never be undertaken 
for expediency reasons, practical or material reasons or with the mo-
tivation that would amount to saying that, after all, the “receiver” 
will not check the translation, for a variety of reasons, and will ac-
cept the translation as being accurate and faithful to the original for-
eign legal concept or institution.15  
When translating concepts into words, and vice-versa, one must 
be aware that one is also engaged in the practice of an art that re-
quires sensitivity and sensibility, emotion and compassion, under-
standing and inquisition. Just as the pianist must use his hands and 
talent to “interpret” or “translate” into sounds a musical composi-
tion, with the intent to touch the minds and hearts of an audience, so 
requires the art and technique of translating. Music critics who hear 
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the same Mozart concerto will seldom share exactly, or to the same 
extent, the same views on the pianist’s performance because their 
hearts and minds will not have heard the same sounds nor felt the 
same emotions with the same intensity. The translator and the pia-
nist are given a “written score,” which is not their creation; yet, 
somehow, they must attempt to immerse themselves into the person 
and personality of the author-composer so as to allow and entice the 
reader or listener to do likewise. A musical score is under the fingers 
of a pianist like the words of a text are under the pen of a translator.  
In civil law terms, a translator is under an “obligation of result” 
and, to a large extent, also under a “strictly personal obligation.” He 
must reach that result with his personal talent, knowledge, and sa-
voir faire, as he should be fully aware that “allusions can be missed” 
and that “a bias can be introduced here and there.”16 It is with this 
frame of mind and with these motivating guides that we undertook 
to turn parts of the Vocabulaire Juridique into a Dictionary of the 
Civil Law. 
In translating parts of the Vocabulaire Juridique of Gérard 
Cornu, we became very quickly aware of the profound meaning of 
these words written by Gérard Cornu:  
If one accepts the hypothesis that the language of the law 
presents linguistic markers sufficient to contribute a special-
ized language, then it must be postulated that every language 
of this order necessarily grows and develops in the bosom of 
a language and, therefore, that a French juridical vocabulary 
does so in the bosom of the French language: a nourishing 
link that not only invites the comparison of this specialized 
language with current language or with other technical lan-
guages, but also demands that one respect the genius of the 
language to which it belongs in its norms and its evolution  
. . . . Monolingual and monolithic, this work draws only from 
the French language and expresses only the French juridical 
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system. From these limits we nourish the hope of compen-
sating for the loss of extent with depth.17  
Our translation of excerpts from the Vocabulaire Juridique did 
indeed draw from the French language, but we meant to go far be-
yond expressing only the French juridical system. The reason was 
that we intended to extract from the Vocabulaire Juridique as many 
entries as we could identify as being “civil law” in their essence and 
thus related particularly to the civil law of the state of Louisiana. 
Hence, the addition of, under a large number of entries and next to 
articles of the French Civil Code, references to articles of the Loui-
siana Civil Code. Thereby the reader will be able to relate articles of 
the French Civil Code18 to articles of the Louisiana Civil Code, 
which have been exclusively in English since 1870.19 Indeed, we 
wonder which civil code, other than the Louisiana Civil Code, could 
have been a better source of articles expressing the civil law in Eng-
lish? 
The words of Gérard Cornu cited above, “monolingual and mon-
olithic” on the one hand, and “only from the French language” on 
the other hand, awakened in us a deeply felt concern, namely that 
the enterprise upon which we had hoped to embark, translate the 
Vocabulaire into English, might be futile, even hopeless. Why had 
this work of translation not been done before? We ultimately con-
cluded that such an enterprise was not so difficult as to be impossi-
ble. However, “we” in Louisiana have spoken and written the civil 
law in English for centuries. Since the 1870s, although confronted 
with the dominance of the English language and the increased influ-
ence of the common law, we nevertheless succeeded in turning the 
English language into an instrument for the defense of the civil law. 
                                                                                                             
 17. DICTIONARY OF THE CIVIL CODE, supra note 9, at XVII, XX. 
 18. See the French Civil Code in English on Legifrance, https://perma.cc 
/A4PS-MJJM. 
 19. For the history of the Louisiana civil codes, see ALAIN A. LEVASSEUR, 
LOUIS CASIMIR ELISABETH MOREAU-LISLET, FOSTER FATHER OF LOUISIANA 
CIVIL LAW (LSU Paul M. Hebert Law Center Publications Institute 1996); ALAIN 
A. LEVASSEUR & VICENÇ FELIÚ, MOREAU LISLET: THE MAN BEHIND THE DIGEST 
OF 1808 (Claitor’s 2008). 




We made ours the words of Gérard Cornu: “the language of the law 
is, to a major extent, a legacy of tradition.”20 In undertaking an Eng-
lish translation of the civil law entries of the Vocabulaire, we were 
fully aware of the challenges we had to face. However, we were also 
extremely confident in our “Louisiana civil law in English,” because 
we were well aware that our codifiers of the past had wisely and 
skillfully used the English language of the average, common English 
speaking layman, rather than the English language of the common 
law technicians, the judiciary in particular: “[a]fter all, we are and 
have long been English speaking civilians.”21 Our voice, however, 
is only now being heard and we owe it to two of our most skilled 





                                                                                                             
 20. GÉRARD CORNU, LINGUISTIQUE JURIDIQUE 19 (3d ed., Montchrestien 
2005). 
 21. DICTIONARY OF THE CIVIL CODE, supra note 9, at XIII. 
